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ABSTRACT
In this paper we trace changes in monetary policy caused by
institutional amendments in legal acts of central banks. We
e s t i m a t e  c o e f f i c i e n t s  o f  t h e  T a y l o r  R u l e  f o r  c e n t r a l  b a n k s  o f
Sweden, United Kingdom, Switzerland and EU15 to shed some
light on monetary policy ex ante and ex post significant
improvements in central bank independence. Results presented
suggest differences in accommodating monetary policy in
countries and support the idea that initial level of CBI matters for
reactions to variability both of inflation and output gap. A pre-
independence period characterizes with strong inflation targeting
features, whereas a post-independence time resembles more
d i s c r e t i o n a r y  t y p e  o f  m o n e t a r y  p o l i c y .  A s  a  s p i n - o f f  f r o m  o u r
original idea, we find that changing properties of inflation in the
last decade make econometric analysis more difficult
JEL: E02, E52
Keywords: Taylor rule, central bank independence, interest rate
rulesContact information
Aleksandra Masáowska
Department of Economics and
Public Choice Research Centre
University of Turku
Assistentinkatu 7
20014 University of Turku
Finland
Tel. +358 2 333 6439
Email: aleksandra.maslowska (at) utu.fi
Acknowledgements
The Author would like to thank for comments and suggestions
professor Matti Virén, Mervi Toivanen, Jan Fidrmuc, Kari
Heimonen and Mika Widgrén. Remaining errors are all mine.
Financial support from TOP and OP-Säätiö is greatly
acknowledged.1 Introduction
We agree with the common opinion that institutions matter. In this paper
we answer the question: how? This paper characterizes empirically how the
chosen central banks have conducted monetary policy since the beginning
of the 1990s. We focus on countries with distinct institutional changes in
their central banks laws. We estimate monetary policy reaction functions
for Sweden and the United Kingdom, which recorded improvements in the
degree of central bank independence (CBI).
The objective of this paper is to trace changes in monetary policy that
could result in remodeling of central banks’ institutions. In particular, our
objective is to ask the question whether and how, increased independence can
aﬀect central bank’s behaviour. Two motivations provoke our investigation.
First, the modern model of central banking assumes the institution being
at least partly autonomous from the government and other political parties.
After many studies, concentrating on proving economically positive eﬀects of
higher level of CBI, countries around the world joined the trend of ensuring
monetary authorities with enough independence to autonomously operate
in monetary area. So far the rule applied was to look for economic eﬀects
of increased independence of monetary authority by explaining changes of
inﬂation with variety of regressors, including CBI as one of them. Our
study reaches for concrete models of monetary rules and traces correlations
between institutions and economy there.
Second, in the course of our analysis, we have noticed a repeating situ-
ation when coeﬃcients for the ex post period were often insigniﬁcantly dif-
ferent from zero. Moreover, in most of cases, these coeﬃcients represented
relation between interest and inﬂation rate. After many veriﬁcations of our
data and making sure we do not make any data or/and calculation mistake,
we have decided to accept this “astonishing stubbornness” of results. Since
it was not the ﬁrst time that it was diﬃcult to show signiﬁcant relationship
between inﬂation and interest rates or other variables, we accepted the fact
that in recent years properties of inﬂation have changed. We understand
this situation, as we explain later, as a case, when the answer to changing
interest rates is a stable inﬂation rate.
As our estimation practice, we focus on the interest-rate rule proposed
by John Taylor (1993), which describes responds to inﬂation while setting
the interest rate. Among others, Clarida et al. (1998), Hetzel (2000) and
Orphanides (2003) bring theoretical discussion on the rules along with some
empirical evidence. Despite its simplicity, Taylor’s rule has stimulated much
useful research on monetary policy. Moreover, as Clarida et al. (1999) em-
phesize “the rule is consistent with the main principles for optimal policy”
that is: (1) it has the nominal rate adjust more than one-for-one with in-
ﬂation rate; (2) real rates adjust to engineer inﬂation back to target, and
ﬁnally; (3) the rule calls for countercyclical response do demand shocks and
1accommodation of shocks to potential GDP that do not aﬀect the output
gap.
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 summarizes the most im-
portant theoretical ﬁndings that form a foundation for this study. That is,
it reviews the basic theory of solutions to optimal institutional design of
central banks, along with the theory on the Taylor’s rule. The methodology
used for empirical estimation, as well as data description is characterized in
Section 3. Section 4 presents results of estimations. Concluding remarks are
in Section 5.
2 Theoretical background
2.1 The case for of an independent central bank
2.1.1 Institutional design of a modern central bank
The institutional design approach focuses on delegating monetary policy to
a central bank, which will engage in low-inﬂation policies. It is possible
using the legislative means as a tool. Several designing solutions, which
may exist separately or overlap, concentrate on restricting a central banker’s
activity with either (1) a performance contract (as described in e.g. Persson
and Tabellini, 1994; Walsh, 1995), (2) a targeting rule, which would specify
conditions to be fulﬁlled by the central bank’s target variables (e.g. Svensson
2005), or (3) legally transfer full/partial autonomy in conducting monetary
policy. These solutions are based on arrangements that a constitutional or
institutional-design stage creates principles of the central bank behavior,
which cannot be easily changed because changing the institution ex post is
costly or/and it can take time. This issue has also ﬁnd itself in the area of
criticism, in particular by McCallum (1997) and Posen (1993), who argue
that some of proposed solutions “do not ﬁx the dynamic inconsistency” but
they“merely relocate it”.
All three solutions are possible to ﬁnd in ‘real’ economic practice, the
latter two, however, have in recent years witnessed both theoretical atten-
tion and practical implementation. The concept of independence implies
that the central bank is able to set policy without interference or restriction
from other agents. That is a general explanation, which is accompanied
with the other idea that an independent central bank acts as a signal to
private agents about forthcoming policy actions. Theoretical justiﬁcation of
this institution starts with Kydland and Prescott (1977), and later Barro
and Gordon(1983), who develop and explain the idea of time inconsistency
and credibility of a central bank, building this way a foundation for further
studies. The topic of autonomy has evolve later toward ﬁnding the optimal
deﬁnition of this phenomenon and the way of quantifying it. The clusters
of central bank attributes, deﬁning its independence, include structural or-
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its objectives, and restrictions concerning lending to the private sector. A
detailed description of the problem can be found in e.g. Berger et al. (2001).
2.1.2 How does independence matter?
The choice of central banks, which we include into our analysis, has been led
with one crucial criterion: the presence of the evolution of the legal system
in area of a central bank’s organization and activity. At ﬁrst, we have
concentrated on analyzing the history of central banking in many countries,
with respect to obvious improvements in four clusters of CBI, mentioned
above. The presence of inﬂation targeting from the beginning of the analyzed
period has been important to us, as well. This way we could be ensured that
changes in the monetary policy were, indeed, the result of legal changes of
the Bank’s institutions, rather than of a leading monetary policy rule. Both
criteria have been fulﬁlled in case of Sweden, Switzerland and the United
Kingdom.
It is also important to notice that many European countries, which ad-
justed their legal acts toward more independent monetary authority, could
not be included here due to their joining the European Monetary Union.
In many cases, law amendments were made very shortly before their EMU
membership, and hence the data series would have been too short for the
analysis.
The choice of countries was inspired not only by the fact of tracing con-
sequences of institutional changes but also by our primary expectations of
what kind of reaction can be found. All three countries, Sweden, Switzer-
land, and the United Kingdom could be called as a homogenous group if we
decide to use the IMF criteria of the degree of development. In many other
aspects these three countries do not diﬀer much from one another. However,
in our case, once analyzed the institutional design of central banks, these
three states have varying histories.
Being the oldest in the world, the Riksbank (central bank of Sweden) has
had a considerably high degree of independence for the most of its operating
time. Introducing inﬂation targeting from January 1993 brought a certain
monetary discipline. The subsequent change of the legal act granting the
Bank a higher degree of independence was a natural step for the Bank.
New legislation, which we are interested in, came into force on January 1,
1999 and, as monetary authority explains in their report, the new legislation
gave “a legal form to the independence that monetary policy already had
in practice” (Sveriges Report, 1999, p.4). It is represented by the shift on
monetary policy from the General Council to an Executive Board. Moreover,
external communication had improved as well with publishing of the minutes
from the monetary policy meetings.
The history of the Bank of England has tied the Bank strongly to the
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1946 enabled the Treasury to give directions to the Bank about the monetary
policy. The monetary policy was strongly a part of Government policy. After
all, it had been the chancellor of exchequer who, for years, had been setting
interest rates. Thus, the 1998 amendment, the crucial for the Bank and for
our analysis change in the Bank’s legislation, shifted that major monetary
responsibility from the Treasury to the Bank of England. This and many
other alteration of the Bank’s role aimed to fulﬁll the Maastricht Treaty
requirements, as well as modern style of central banking.
Finally, we include Switzerland and EU15 to the sample and we treat
them as our control countries. Due to the special character in ﬁnancial
markets, as well as high development of democratic institutions, Switzer-
land “developed into an island of political and economic stability, estab-
lishing itself an important ﬁnancial hub”(Commemorative publication“The
Swiss National Bank 1907-2007”). As its policy, The Bank chose a stability-
oriented monetary policy, which became an international standards years
later. These factors had certainly an impact on ﬁnal evaluation of the de-
gree the Bank pursue its policy autonomously, placing it, along with the
Bundesbank, repeatedly on the top of the list. The new Federal Consti-
tution, which includes crucial points on the type of monetary policy, was
accepted in a public referendum in April 1999. The document clariﬁes the
type of an exchange rate, as well as gives the sole right in pursuing mone-
tary policy autonomously but it did not clearly state that the price stability
would be the major goal of the central bank. This has been added in the
next document, Federal Act on the Swiss National Bank. For our study,
we choose to identify January 1, 2000 as a date of importance for monetary
policy in Switzerland.
The intuition behind choosing EU15 as a control“country”to our study
lays in the well-known disinﬂationary type of monetary policy accompanied
by high degree of central bank independence. Even though all 15 countries
are diﬀerent from each other in many economic aspects, their monetary his-
tory is connected with one important goal - common currency. The 1990s
witnessed a process of gradual adjustment in all countries with respect to
their central bank legislation, structural organization of monetary author-
ities and major goals of monetary policy. Thus, our data analysis starts
in 1990, when the Stage One to Economic and European Union had be-
gun, while as a point of the “improvement in central bank independence”
we choose January 1, 1999, when the Stage Three began (three stages of
European integration according to the Delors Report, 1989).
From these short descriptions of institutional improvements we see that
each bank recorded a change of a diﬀerent kind. In our opinion, the Riksbank
has made legal the process that had been eﬀective for a long time. Both,
for the market and the Bank, this change represented a “sealing of a deal”,
thus, in our analysis, we expect smaller diﬀerences between coeﬃcients for
4inﬂation and output gap in two subperiods.
Our expectations are diﬀerent when it comes to the Bank of England.
Granting an operational independence to the Bank shifts the monetary
power from the government to the monetary authority. What follows, it
sends a strong signal to the market not only about political exclusion from
the policy process but also about the change in the type of monetary pol-
icy. Such a strong shift in the degree of independence has to, in our mind,
inﬂuence the whole monetary policy in a signiﬁcant way.
2.2 Taylor rule as a contemporary policy approximation
The well-known Taylor rule (Taylor, 1993) directs the central bank to react
to deviations of the inﬂation rate from a target level. It does so without any
relation to the absolute level that prices may have reached. Such concern
with the inﬂation rate rather than the level of prices, as Woodford (2003)
explains, would seem to characterize policy in all advanced countries in
recent years.
Taylor proposed a rule for setting interest rates (the U.S. Federal Re-
serve’s funds-rate operating target) based on a linear function of measures
of the current inﬂation rate and the current gap between real and poten-
tial output. His estimation of coeﬃcients indicate that, in order to respond
properly to the rise of inﬂation above the target, the nominal interest rate
operating target should be raised by more than the amount by which in-
ﬂation exceeds the target. Thus, Fed’s simple reaction function is of the
form
it = ı + φπ(πt − π) + φxxt (1)
where it is the funds rate, The prior four-quarter inﬂation rate is πt and
the FOMC’s inﬂation target is π. The output gap, xt, is the percentage
deviation of real GDP from a trend line measuring potential output.
Taylor proposed a feedback policy with symmetric weight 0.5 given both
to inﬂation and output gaps. Moreover, a constant term, 2, is assigned by
Taylor as well to represent long-run average of the real rate of interest and
the same value for inﬂation target. Thus, after transformations, the Taylor
rule can take the following form with estimated coeﬃcients for the Fed
it = 0.04 + 1.5(πt − 0.02) + 0.5(yt − y
p
t), (2)
where we use xt and yt to represent output interchangeably.
The Taylor rule has been modiﬁed to include various elements of modern
central banking. First, a static relation like equation (1)cannot capture the
serial correlation present in the data, thus a modiﬁcation of the rule leads to
a dynamic speciﬁcation. Second we see proposals of speciﬁcations in which
a bank’s operating target depends on forecasts. The example of the former
is given by (among others) Judd and Rudebusch (1998), who estimate Fed
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in response to changes in an implicit desired level of the funds rate ıt. The
‘actual’ interest rate it is partially adjusted to the target according to the
form
it = ρit−1 + (1 − ρ)i∗
t (3)
where ρ is a parameter that measures the degree of interest rate smoothing.
Substituting (1) into (3) results in the following equation
it = ρit−1 + (1 − ρ)α + (1 − ρ)(γππ + γyy) + ǫt (4)
with
α = r∗ + πT
where we unify notations and use i for interest rate, r∗ is the long-run
equilibrium real interest rate, and γπ and γy are coeﬃcients for inﬂation and
output gaps respectively. Model with an interest rate smoothing parame-
ter (or otherwise called a partial adjustment to the target) eliminates the
concern that a simple rule could not capture the tendency of central banks
to smooth changes in interest rates. Clarida et al. (1998) explains that
the necessity to smooth interest rates is justiﬁed with the fear of disrupting
capital markets, loss of credibility from sudden large policy reversal, or the
need for consensus building to support a policy change.
A “forward-looking” Taylor rule is suggested by Clarida et al. (1999)
who suggest a version of the simple Taylor rule:
i∗
t = α + γπ(Etπt+1 − π) + γxxt (5)
Under this rule, policy responds to expected inﬂation as opposed to
lagged one.
Major principle in the Taylor rule (the so-called ‘Taylor principle’) as-
sumes that the nominal interest-rate is being adjusted by more than the
amount by which inﬂation exceeds the target. Put diﬀerently, the coeﬃ-
cient for inﬂation is expected to exceeds the unity in the case of the optimal
policy. Hence, the key lessons drawn from the estimation of this policy
reaction function concentrates on analyzing the coeﬃcient for inﬂation gap.
If one assumes that the coeﬃcient for inﬂation gap is smaller than one
φπ < 1, that is on contrary to Taylor’s principle, the expectational diﬀerence
equation for the inﬂation rate has an inﬁnity of bounded solutions, so that
equilibrium inﬂation in this case is indeterminate, like in the case of pure
interest-rate control (see e.g. Leeper (1991); for the analysis: Woodford
(2003)). Positive coeﬃcients much less than one on inﬂation for the period
1960-1979, Taylor (1999) interprets as the instability of U.S. inﬂation and
real activity during the 1970s, that is indicate passive interest-rate responses.
63 Data and methodology
We perform our investigation by estimating simple and modiﬁed Taylor
rules. A general critique of these methods lays in using historical data,
whilst the appropriateness of the rule would require the use of ‘real-time
data’. To compensate the use of historical data, as well as due to the short
time span, we follow Clarida et al. (1998) and Faust et al. (2001) and use
monthly data (when possible). Second analysis for quarterly data is referring
to those studies, which treat quarter data as more obvious frequency.
The estimated models are of the form we have presented in the theoretical
description. For the sake of transparency, we bring them again with the ﬁnal
notations we use in this analysis
1. Speciﬁcation (1) - “simple” Taylor rule
it = α + γππ + γyyt + ǫt (6)
2. Speciﬁcation (2) - Taylor rule with an “interest-rate smoothing” pa-
rameter
it = ρit−1 + (1 − ρ)α + (1 − ρ)(γππ + γyy) + ǫt (7)
The history of institutional changes in central banks of each country,
as brieﬂy described in paragraph 2.1.2, determines time intervals of our
analysis. Table 1 in appendix brings detailed information on periods for each
central bank. We have collected information on the data and time series
directly from central banks related countries and their statistical oﬃces.
We have also beneﬁt hugely from the Statistical Oﬃce of the European
Communities (Eurostat) and partly data was downloaded from the OECD
statistical resource engine. Here we would like to mention that previous
versions of this paper included larger variety of countries (for instance from
Central and Easter Europe). However, due to a problem with reliability of
data and many revisions of data since the political and economic transition,
we decided not to include them in the ﬁnal version. Perhaps that is material
for further work.
Nominal short-term interest rate In his original study, Taylor has
used the federal funds rate, which was later replicated as the natural choice
for the U.S. In other papers, which include diﬀerent samples, the short-term
interest rate is represented by an interbank lending rate for overnight loans,
or a 3-month Treasury bill.
Here, representation of this variable diﬀers depending on the country,
data availability or time period. The choice of the ﬁnal interest rate has been
done based on the information provided by central banks in each country.
Thus, we have included in the study the following interest rates deﬁnitions:
71. Sweden - the key interest rate - repo rate - the rate of interest at which
banks can borrow or deposit fundsat the Riksbank for a period of seven
days (4 ﬁrst quarters for repo is a marginal rate, which stopped being
published after introducing repo).
2. Switzerland - the key interest rate - three-month LIBOR.
3. United Kingdom - 3-month Treasury Bill rate.
4. EU15 - money-market 3-month interest rate (EURIBOR; interchange-
ably with EONIA)
Inﬂation rate Due to the sample diﬀerences, the access to the inﬂation
data has also varied signiﬁcantly. Considering all the criticism of the Con-
sumer Price Index (CPI) and various its deﬁnitions found in the literature,
we have decided to use information from central bank’s webpages. Thus,
the relevant inﬂation rate for Sweden is the underlying inﬂation CPIX. In
the case of the United Kingdom, we followed Nelson (2000) and Mihailov
(2006) by including alternative indexes for inﬂation: the Retail Price Index
(RPI), and Retail Price Index excluding the mortgage rate (for our own
sake we checked also RPI excluding housing). Finally measures of inﬂation
represented by HICP and CPI from OECD were used for the EU15 and
Switzerland respectively.
Output gap The most diﬃcult variable to quantify is the output gap.
It is also the most vulnerable for criticism for there is a variety of ways, in
which it can be calculated. Two the most common in this aspect approaches
include using the real gross domestic product (GDP) or the industrial pro-
duction index (IPI) for each country separately. We have performed the
analysis using both of these measures whenever it was possible to ﬁnd the
proper data. We have tested them for seasonality using the standard Census
X12 test in order to apply a Hodrick-Prescott ﬁlter (with the smoothing pa-
rameter set at λ=1600, as suggested in the literature for the quarterly data,
and λ=14400 for monthly data). The actual output gap is calculated as
the percent deviation of real GDP or IPI from a target, as it was originally
proposed by Taylor
y = 100 ∗
Y − Y ∗
Y ∗ (8)
where Y is real GDP (or more often industrial production index), and Y ∗ is
trend real GDP. In the ﬁnal analysis, we have decided to represent output
gap mainly with industrial production index. We made few exceptions for
UK, where we replicate quarterly data both with gdp and industrial pro-
duction, as well as when we found it necessary to check results with other
measures.
84 Monetary policy and central bank independence
Major idea of the experiment in this study is to follow any changes in the
monetary policy rule coeﬃcients, as they may appear while amendments to
institutional design of the central bank appear. In particular, we are in-
terested in the improvements of central bank independence that took place
within almost two decades 1990s and years 2000. Thus, we will discuss
the movements of inﬂation and output coeﬃcients, as well as we’ll ﬁnd
and compare values for the equilibrium real rate. To estimate coeﬃcients
(α,γπ,γy,ρ) we use mainly Least Squares regression method, corrected with
Newey and West standard errors.
[Table 2 AROUND HERE]
Inﬂation gap Note ﬁrst that the global pattern of inﬂation emerges for
all countries (see Fig. 1). A common period of disinﬂation, started already
in the 1980s, brings inﬂation rate to low and stable levels in the 1990s and
the new millennium, despite few temporary upticks. The behavior of short-
term interest rates also is characterized by two diﬀerent patterns. Prior
to 1999-2000 (and we use this breakpoint keeping in mind lagged reactions
to monetary policy changes) central bankers kept interest rates high above
the inﬂation rate and along the passing time we could observe signiﬁcant
decrease in levels of both rates. From year 1999-2000 real as well as nominal
short-term rates keep low but rather stable levels.
The simple Taylor rule, estimated for Sweden and the United Kingdom,
brings straightforward indication of policy rules (whenever signiﬁcant). In
case of Sweden, coeﬃcients obtain level above the unity for the whole period
as well as the pre-independence period. Thus, the central bank incorporates
the implicit inﬂation targeting feature in this period. We report several
estimation on the inﬂation gap, depending on the frequency of data and
the type of the rule. Receiving coeﬃcient γπ ranging from 1.52 to 1.91 we
can say that a rise in expected annual inﬂation of one percent indices the
Riksbank to raise real rates by 0.52 (0.91) basis points. In all cases γπ is
signiﬁcantly greater than one and thus the prediction that the Bank raises
real rates in response to inﬂationary pressure is statistically signiﬁcant.
We do not observe this signiﬁcance in all tests in the post-independence
period. Values for the second period are deﬁnitely below the unity indicating
important change in the policy: strengthening of the monetary power could
allow the Bank to react less aggressively to changes in inﬂation rate and
focus on stabilizing the real economy.
Despite mostly insigniﬁcant results for UK, it is interesting to compare
inﬂation gap coeﬃcients between two countries. For the whole period, as
well as in the ﬁrst one, these coeﬃcients are much lower than in the case of
Sweden. That could indicate that the Government, while it had power to set
interest rates, kept in mind ﬁscal goals, as well. A rise in annual inﬂation
9of one percent induced the Riksbank to raise real rates more than in the
same period the Bank of England would care to do. Clearly, explaining this
diﬀerence with only a degree of independence would be an overstatement.
However, we dare to claim that institutions shaping the type of monetary
policy played here the crucial role, as well.
The results above mentioned were obtained using core inﬂation rates re-
spectively for each country (according to the information provided by central
banks and suggested by the literature). We have repeated these estimation
using the“traditional”CPI. As expected, values for inﬂation gap coeﬃcients
diﬀered with the previous ones but it did not change the fact, however,
that these values were again much higher for Sweden than for the United
Kingdom.
Output gap Following Orphanides, we do not focus only on analyzing
coeﬃcients for inﬂation gap. It is similarly important to compare changes
of output gap. In the study on the U.S. economy, involving the forecasts
produced by the Fed staﬀ, Orphanides (2004) underlines not the change
in the inﬂation coeﬃcient but the reduction in the size of output gap esti-
mation. This reduction was interpreted as the key to U.S. macroeconomic
stability since the mid-1980s. However, this coeﬃcient has been hardly ever
signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero.
Lack of statistical signiﬁcance of estimates on output gap in the pre-
independence period we treat, as it was described in the part on inﬂation
gap, as the indication that the banks focused on stabilizing inﬂation rate
more than other parts of economy. For us one outcome is clear: changes
in output gap coeﬃcients are signiﬁcantly diﬀerent. First of all, in most
of cases, these coeﬃcients became signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero in the
post-independence period. Second, their scale is diﬀerent depending on the
frequency of data.
Analyzing monetary policy reaction functions for the Bank of England
we notice that the response to the output gap is much stronger in the post-
independence subsample. In both tests, that is with simple and modiﬁed
Taylor rule, the coeﬃcient is signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero. Considering
the loss of signiﬁcance for the estimates on inﬂation gap in this subperiod,
we draw conclusion that inﬂation targeting is less conservative and less con-
tractionary under the regime with operational independence granted to the
central bank. Our result is in line with ﬁndings of e.g. Mihailov (2006), who
comes to similar conclusions while analyzing British monetary policy using
the real-time data. To some degree this repeats with the rest of countries.
Control countries As described above, we repeated the same analysis for
Switzerland, as our control country. We expected to obtain both steady and
signiﬁcant results. However, similarly to examples of Sweden and UK, all
10coeﬃcients were signiﬁcant except for the one of inﬂation gap in the second
period. Adjusting for diﬀerent measures of inﬂation and output gap did not
change the fact that the coeﬃcient for inﬂation gap lost its signiﬁcance, while
other values for equilibrium interest rate and output gap were signiﬁcant.
We have also changed the length of the second period. During that process,
we also have problems to ﬁnd signiﬁcant results for other variables.
In our subsequent tests with countries belonging to the EMU, we found
the repeating pattern involving relatively high, that is around 2.0, coeﬃcient
for inﬂation gap in the ﬁrst period, and much lower ones, though insigniﬁ-
cant, in the second period representing recent 8-10 years. Weak stability of
inﬂation gap coeﬃcients was found also in this test. The scenario is similar
to previous cases: the second period is characterized with increased signif-
icance of interest rate adjustment as the result to changes in output gaps
variations. Meanwhile, also here, we see no connections between interest
rates movements and changes (or no changes) in the degree of inﬂation.
These unexpected for us patterns helped us to formulate our second hy-
pothesis that due to changing properties of inﬂation, represented by smoothed
trends in inﬂation variability, there is no signiﬁcant relationship between in-
ﬂation and interest rate in the last 8-10 years. Thus only output gap reacts
to current monetary policy. We understand that a pre-independence period
is characterized with strong inﬂation targeting features that is attaching a
larger weight on inﬂation stabilization, which, as feared by inﬂation target-
ing opponents, may act to the detriment of the stability of the real economy.
The post-independence time interval, however, reminds a type of monetary
policy with ﬂexible inﬂation targeting in the sense that central banks not
only aim at stabilizing inﬂation around the target but also put some weight
on stabilizing the real economy, for instance output gap.
Moreover, we want to compare results of these two periods with the
situation in the United States and thus we refer to Taylor rule estimation
for the United States economy, done by Clarida et al. (1999). Table 3
replicates estimation of the “forward looking” version of the simple Taylor
rule for periods “before Volcker” and “after Volcker”. We concentrated our
attention on these results because they are similar to ours in terms of values
and signiﬁcance of coeﬃcients.
[TABLE 3 AROUND HERE]
In the Volcker-Greenspan period (1979:3-96:4), which characterizes with
a successful and long-lasting disinﬂation, the estimate for γπ, the coeﬃcient
on the inﬂation gap, is signiﬁcantly above the unity. Thus, it incorporates
the implicit inﬂation targeting feature. At the same time, the estimated co-
eﬃcient on the output gap, γx, is not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero. These
results are in most of cases the same as our estimates for pre-independence
period. Again, we understand that central banks, equipped with a moderate
level of independence, focus stronger on their major goal of price stability.
These similarities are met again for the other period, where, in case of pre-
11Volcker period, the estimate for output gap is positive and signiﬁcant, while
the inﬂation gap coeﬃcient is less than unity.
5 Concluding remarks
We have assumed that institutional designs of central banks may be reﬂected
with the kind of monetary policy they conduct. Keeping in mind that many
factors inﬂuence central bank’s choices, we performed the analysis of esti-
mated Taylor rules for few countries to trace diﬀerences in monetary policy
ex ante and ex post improvements in the degree of central bank indepen-
dence.
First, our estimates of Taylor rule indicate that the monetary policy
has been diﬀerent in the pre- and post-independence subsamples. In all
countries, central banks incorporate the implicit inﬂation targeting feature
for their monetary policy in the ﬁrst period (despite oﬃcially announcing
this type of policy in some of them). In all countries, coeﬃcient on inﬂation
gap loses statistical signiﬁcance in the post-independence period.
Next, we notice that the response to the output gap is much stronger
in the post-independence subsample in all countries. Considering the loss
of signiﬁcance for the estimates on inﬂation gap in this subperiod, we draw
conclusion that inﬂation targeting is less conservative and less contractionary
under the regime with higher degree of independence granted to central
banks.
We have also noticed varying values of coeﬃcients between countries.
Sweden and the United Kingdom have had diﬀerent levels of CBI, we see
disparities in the choice of institutions between central banks. Thus, we
conclude that the Riksbank has reacted more aggressively to inﬂation rate
variability that is can be noticed in the Bank of England.
Finally, inspired by our previous studies on interactions between central
banks and inﬂation, as well as results we found in studies of other authors,
we suggest that in roughly last ten years successful monetary policy does
not inﬂuence inﬂation rate in the short run. A long-term plan of disinﬂation,
which had been introduced in Europe on a large scale, is possible to trace
with simple monetary rules.
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14A Appendix
Table 1: Factbook for the selected countries
Sweden
Inﬂation target = 2 percent
Periods: 1993m1 - 1998m4 and 1999m1 - 2007m4 (and quarterly)
January 1993 - inﬂation targeting
January 1999 - improvement in central bank’s independence
Oﬃcial document Sveriges Riksbank Act 1998
United Kingdom
Inﬂation target - 2 percent
Periods: 1992m1-1998m12; 1999m1-2007m12 (and quarterly)
October 1992 - inﬂation targeting
The 1998 Act brought into force on 1 June 1998 improvement in CBI
Oﬃcial document Bank of England Act 1998
Switzerland
Inﬂation target = 2 percent
Periods: 1991q1 - 1999q4 and 2000q1 - 2007q4
January 2000 - improvement in CBI
Oﬃcial document Federal Constitution of the Swiss Confederation
of 18 April 1999, RS 101
Federal Act of 3 October 2003 on the Swiss National Bank
(National Bank Act), RS 951.11
EU15
Inﬂation target - no oﬃcial inﬂation targeting but considering a goal of 2 percent
Periods - 1991m1-1998m12; 1999m1-2007m12
January 1, 1999 - improvement in CBI
Oﬃcial document Delors Report on economic and monetary union
in the European Community
The Maastricht Treaty







































Figure 1: Interest rates vs. inﬂation, from the top: Sweden, United Kingdom,
EU15. Source: Data from national central banks and ECB statistics.
16Table 2: Estimated Taylor rules based on Hodrick-Prescott ﬁltered output gap,
















α 4.73 5.14 5.3 5.39 5.17 4.76 3.89
(24.11) (16.76) (6.74) (6.32) (6.11) (28.43) (6.15)
γπ 1.44 1.19 0.53 0.71 0.72 0.28 1.43
(10.58) (8.1) (0.58) (0.85) (0.86) (1.26) (1.44)
γy 0.26 0.58 0.56 0.54 0.70 0.29 1.34
(2.04) (2.93) (1.04) (1.38) (0.71) (2.15) (1.9)
ρ 0.90 0.62 0.75 0.96
(14.53) (2.67) (3.69) (43.47)
No. of obs. 72 28 71 27 27 120 119
Ad. R
2 0.75 0.70 0.95 0.75 0.78 0.06 0.98














α 6.65 6.48 5.19 5.84 3.45 3.58
(33.15) (35.98) (9.5) (20.12) (24.81) (7.92)
γπ 1.91 1.6 1.54 1.52 0.79 0.77
(10.14) (12.54) (5.53) (8.68) (6.85) (1.36)
γy 0.16 0.75 1.06 1.99 0.44 3.01
(2.29) (3.12) (2.97) (2.78) (2.46) (1.05)
ρ 0.93 0.71 0.92
(44.41) (8.94) (12.38)
No. of obs. 72 24 71 23 36 35
Ad. R
2 0.76 0.84 0.99 0.97 0.44 0.92










α 1.4 2.89 1.52 1.89
(3.81) (3.24) (6.58) (2.67)
γπ 1.27 1.05 0.04 0.188
(11.74) (5.68) (0.19) (0.33)
γy 0.11 0.53 0.83 0.30
(1.67) (1.01) (6.50) (5.58)
ρ 0.85 0.69
(8.57) (5.9)
No. of obs. 40 39 39 39
Ad. R
2 0.87 0.97 0.69 0.94












α 5.98 4.72 4.62 3.06 3.28
(34.85) (4.46) (3.62) (20.26) (8.18)
γπ 2.19 2.01 1.96 0.14 -0.84
(13.72) (7.04) (6.14) (0.51) (-1.01)
γy 0.12 1.13 1.18 0.39 1.49
(1.17) (1.18) (1.07) (3.61) (2.58)
ρ 0.94 0.95 0.95
(20.31) (19.56) (48.11)
No.of obs. 96 95 95 108 107
Ad. R
2 0.82 0.99 0.99 0.25 0.98
DW 0.21 2.00 1.89 0.19 1.95










q - speciﬁcation based on smoothing rule with monthly and quarterly
data.
17Table 3: Estimates of policy reaction function
γπ γx ρ
Pre-Volcker 0.83 (0.07) 0.27 (0.08) 0.68 (0.05)
Volcker-Greenspan 2.15 (0.40) 0.93 (0.42) 0.79 (0.04)
Source: Clarida et al. (1999), “The Science of Monetary Policy: A New Keynesian
Perspective”, Journal of Economic Literature, Vol. XXXVII.
Notes: γπ - coeﬃcient for inﬂation gap;
γx - coeﬃcient for output gap;
ρ - smoothing parameter.
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